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I.

INTRODUCTION

Tiffany Parker’s trial started and ended with Facebook. On December 2,
2011, Parker fought with Sheniya Brown over Facebook messages regarding a
mutual love interest. 1 Later that night, Parker allegedly posted entries on her
Facebook page containing content such as “bet tht [sic] bitch didnt [sic] think [I]
was going to see her ass . . . bet she wont [sic] inbox me no more,
#caughtthatbitch.” 2 After the jury rejected Parker’s claim of self-defense and
convicted her of second-degree assault, the sole basis for her appeal was that the
prosecution failed to properly authenticate the Facebook entries as ones she had
authored. 3
In addressing the issue, the Delaware Supreme Court noted that courts
have applied two conflicting approaches regarding the authentication of social
media evidence. Most courts apply a traditional authentication standard based
on the assumption “that the risk of forgery exists with any evidence.” 4 Other
courts, however, impose a higher authentication bar based on forgery concerns
unique to social media evidence. 5 This Essay argues against the majority

* Associate Dean for Faculty Development & Associate Professor, University of South Carolina
School of Law; Blog Editor, EvidenceProf Blog: http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/.
** Student, University of South Carolina School of Law; J.D. expected, 2015.
1. Parker v. State, 85 A.3d 682, 683 (Del. 2014).
2. Id. at 684.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 686.
5. Id.
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approach and in favor of a more stringent authentication standard for social
media evidence.
II.

AUTHENTICATION FRAMEWORK

Before a party can introduce evidence, it must first provide some indication
that the evidence is what the party claims it to be, i.e., it must authenticate the
evidence. For example, a prosecutor seeking to introduce a confession note
allegedly written by the defendant must first present evidence that the defendant
in fact wrote the letter. According to Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a),
To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of
evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is. 6
This authentication standard is the same as the conditional relevance
standard contained in Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b): 7 If a reasonable juror
could find the conditional fact—authentication—by a preponderance of the
evidence, Rule 901(a) has been satisfied. 8
Rule 901(b), in turn, provides ten nonexhaustive illustrations of how a party
can authenticate evidence. For example, Rule 901(b)(1) allows for
authentication through testimony of a witness with knowledge. Under this Rule,
any witness who saw the defendant write a confession note could authenticate
the note as one written by the defendant. Meanwhile, Rule 901(b)(2) allows for
authentication via nonexpert opinion about handwriting, which would allow for
the defendant’s wife, friend, or co-worker to authenticate a confession note
based on familiarity with the way that the defendant “dots his i’s and crosses his
t’s.” 9 Furthermore, Rule 901(b)(3) would allow either a handwriting expert (or
the trier of fact) to compare the confession note with a handwriting exemplar, or
other writing indisputably written by the defendant, to establish that the same
person wrote both. 10
In other cases, the proponent can authenticate an exhibit through an
accumulation of circumstantial evidence under Rule 901(b)(4). This Rule
permits authentication through “[t]he appearance, contents, substance, internal
patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all
the circumstances.” 11

6. FED. R. EVID. 901(a).
7. See FED. R. EVID. 104(b) (“When the relevance of evidence depends on whether a fact exists,
proof must be introduced sufficient to support a finding that the fact does exist. The court may admit
the proposed evidence on the condition that the proof be introduced later.”).
8. See United States v. Branch, 970 F.2d 1368, 1370 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating that authenticity is a
question for the jury, and indicating that admissibility is governed by the procedure set forth in
Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b)).
9. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(2) (providing that a person familiar with the handwriting may
testify that it is genuine, provided that the knowledge was not “acquired for the current litigation”).
10. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(3) (providing that “an authenticated specimen” may be used for
comparison by an expert witness or the trier of fact).
11. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4).
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For example, in Hislop v. State, 12 the prosecution used the following
circumstantial evidence to authenticate a note which allegedly contained the
defendant’s confession to murdering his mother: (1) an officer found the note in
the home shared by the defendant and his mother; (2) the note was underneath a
billfold beside the couch on which the defendant was lying; (3) the billfold
contained a second note in which the defendant asked his veterinarian to take
care of his cat; and (4) the defendant’s neighbor and paramedic both testified
that the defendant confessed to stabbing his mother. 13 According to the Court of
Appeals of Texas, “this combination of factors serve[d] to provide an adequate
level of authentication to meet the initial criteria of Rule 901 and provide[d] the
necessary condition precedent to admissibility.” 14
III. SOCIAL MEDIA EVIDENCE
According to the Delaware Supreme Court in Parker v. State, 15 “[s]ocial
media has been defined as ‘forms of electronic communications . . . through
which users create online communities to share information, ideas, personal
messages, and other content.’” 16 On social media sites such as Facebook and
Twitter, a user can create a personal profile and post content, including text,
pictures, and videos, which are available to Internet users at large and delivered
to the author’s subscribers. 17
Attorneys are increasingly introducing social media evidence as exhibits at
trial. For example, eighty-one percent of American Academy of Matrimonial
Lawyers indicated in response to a survey that “they have seen an increase in the
number of cases using social networking evidence during the past five years,” 18
with such evidence being used in an estimated ninety percent of divorce cases. 19
As a result, “[t]he authentication of social media evidence has become a
prevalent issue in litigation today, creating much confusion and disarray for
attorneys and judges.” 20

12. 64 S.W.3d 544 (Tex. App. 2001).
13. Hislop, 64 S.W.3d at 545–46.
14. Id. at 546.
15. 85 A.3d 682 (Del. 2014).
16. Parker, 85 A.3d at 685 (quoting Honorable Paul W. Grimm et al., Authentication of Social
Media Evidence, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 433, 434 (2013)) (omission in original).
17. Id.
18. Press Release, Am. Acad. Matrimonial Law, Big Surge in Social Networking Evidence Says
Survey of Nation’s Top Divorce Lawyers (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.aaml.org/about-theacademy/press/press-releases/e-discovery/big-surge-social-networking-evidence-says-survey-.
19. Janie Porter, Facebook Used in 90 Percent of Divorce Cases, WTSP NEWS,
http://www.wtsp.com/news/article/189649/8/Facebook-used-in-90-percent-of-divorce-cases (last visited
Nov. 11, 2014) (supporting that estimation with anecdotal evidence).
20. Grimm, supra note 16, at 433.
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IV. THE AUTHENTICATION OF SOCIAL MEDIA EVIDENCE
A.

The Business as Usual Approach

Confronted with social media evidence, most courts have applied the
traditional approach to authentication, typically relying on Rule 901(b)(4). For
instance, in Tienda v. State, 21 Ronnie Tienda, Jr. was charged with murdering
David Valadez. 22 At trial, the prosecution introduced messages such as “I live to
stay fresh!! I kill to stay rich!!” from three MySpace pages allegedly created by
Tienda. 23 The trial court found that the prosecution properly authenticated this
evidence under Rule 901(b)(4). 24 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals later
agreed, concluding that “the internal content of the MySpace postings—
photographs, comments, and music—was sufficient circumstantial evidence to
establish a prima facie case such that a reasonable juror could have found that
they were created and maintained by the appellant.” 25 The court acknowledged
that Tienda could have been the victim of “malefactors” who created or hacked
the MySpace pages, “somehow stole the appellant’s numerous self-portrait
photographs, [and] concocted boastful messages about David Valadez’s murder
and the circumstances of that shooting.” 26 But the court concluded that these
possibilities merely went to the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility. 27
Later, in Parker, the Delaware Supreme Court relied on Tienda and Rule
901(b)(4) to find that the prosecution had properly authenticated Facebook
entries in which Tiffany Parker allegedly boasted about attacking Sheniya Brown
earlier in the day. 28 According to the court:
First, the substance of the Facebook post referenced the altercation
that occurred between Parker and Brown. Although the post does not
mention Brown by name, it was created on the same day after the
altercation and referenced a fight with another woman. Second,
Brown’s testimony provided further authenticating evidence. Brown
testified that she viewed Parker’s post through a mutual friend.
Thereafter, Brown “shared” the post and published it on her own
Facebook page. Collectively, this evidence was sufficient for the trial
court to find that a reasonable juror could determine that the proffered
evidence was authentic. 29

21. 358 S.W.3d 633, 634 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
22. Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 634.
23. Id. at 635.
24. Id. at 637.
25. Id. at 641–42.
26. Id. at 645–46.
27. Id. at 646; see also State v. Assi, No. 1 CA-CR 10-0900, 2012 WL 3580488 (Ariz. App. 2012)
(finding that the defendant’s arguments about the authenticity of MySpace evidence went to weight
and not admissibility).
28. 85 A.3d 682, 686–87 (Del. 2014) (citing FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4); Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 633).
29. Id. at 688.
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The Stricter Approach

Other courts have raised the authentication bar in cases involving social
media evidence. In Smith v. State, 30 Scott Smith was convicted of capital murder
in connection with the death of his wife’s seventeen-month-old daughter, Ally. 31
At trial, the prosecution had admitted Facebook messages allegedly authored by
Smith concerning his problems with his wife and her daughter, such as, “[I] feel
my temper building and [I] know [I] will hurt someone, they are playing with fire
and have no clue.” 32 The trial court deemed these messages authenticated under
Mississippi Rule of Evidence 901(b)(4), relying on Smith’s wife’s allegation that
the page belonged to him, the fact that the Facebook page was created by “Scott
Smith,” and the fact that it contained a photograph of Smith. 33
The Supreme Court of Mississippi later reversed, finding that “[t]he
authentication of social media poses unique issues regarding what is required to
make a prima facie showing that the matter is what the proponent claims.” 34
Specifically, the court observed that “[t]he ease with which defendants and
alleged victims alike could fabricate a social media account to corroborate a
story necessitates more than a simple name and photograph to sufficiently link
the communication to the purported author under Rule 901.” 35
The Court of Appeals of Maryland reached a similar conclusion in Griffin v.
State. 36 In Griffin, Antoine Griffin, also known by the nickname “Boozy,” was
charged with various crimes in connection with the shooting death of Darvell
Guest. 37 At trial, the State sought to prove that the defendant’s girlfriend, Jessica
Barber, threatened a witness for the prosecution by posting on her MySpace
page, “FREE BOOZY!!!! JUST REMEMBER SNITCHES GET STITCHES!!
U KNOW WHO YOU ARE!!” 38 The trial court found that the prosecution
properly authenticated the MySpace page, and the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland agreed, finding that Barber’s “photograph, personal information, and
references to freeing ‘Boozy’” satisfied Maryland Rule of Evidence 5901(b)(4). 39
The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed, noting that “[t]he potential for
fabricating or tampering with electronically stored information on a social
networking site . . . poses significant challenges from the standpoint of
authentication of printouts of the site.” 40 Specifically, the court concluded that
[t]he potential for abuse and manipulation of a social networking site
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

136 So.3d 424 (Miss. 2014).
Smith, 136 So.3d at 426–27.
Id. at 430 (alterations in original).
Id. at 433–35.
Id. at 432, 435.
Id. at 433–344.
19 A.3d 415 (Md. 2011).
Griffin, 19 A.3d at 417–18.
Id. at 418.
Id. at 423.
Id. at 422–424.
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by someone other than its purported creator and/or user leads to our
conclusion that a printout of an image from such a site requires a
greater degree of authentication than merely identifying the date of
birth of the creator and her visage in a photograph on the site. 41
The Court of Appeals of Maryland then suggested three nonexhaustive ways in a
which a party could authenticate social media evidence: (1) testimony by the
alleged creator of the website that she actually created the page and posted the
disputed content, (2) evidence obtained from a search of the Internet history and
hard drive of the alleged author’s computer, and (3) information directly
obtained from the relevant social networking website. 42
V.

RAISING THE BAR

The split of authority acknowledged by the Delaware Supreme Court in
Parker also suggests the test that should be used for determining whether the
authentication bar should be raised for social media evidence: If the risk of
forgery with social media evidence is similar to the forgery risk for other
evidence, and if the circumstantial evidence typically used to authenticate
exhibits under Rule 901(b)(4) is similarly able to quell concerns regarding that
risk, the authentication bar should not be raised. 43 But if there is a higher forgery
risk with social media evidence, or if the typical circumstantial evidence does not
alleviate doubts concerning social media authorship, the authentication bar
should be raised. 44
A.

The Higher Forgery Risk Associated With Social Media Evidence

Assume the prosecution claims that the defendant handwrote a confession
note, while the defendant claims that the note is a forgery. How easy will it be to
determine whether the note was forged? The Advisory Committee Note to
Federal Rule of Evidence 901 indicates that “[t]he common law approach to
authentication of documents has been criticized . . . as one which . . . present[s]
only a slight obstacle to the introduction of forgeries.” 45 But the Advisory
Committee rejects that concern and notes that “significant inroads upon the
traditional insistence on authentication and identification have been made by
accepting as at least prima facie genuine items of the kind treated in Rule 902.” 46
Federal Rule of Evidence 902 in turn allows for the self-authentication of
twelve types of evidence, meaning that “they require no extrinsic evidence of
authenticity in order to be admitted.” 47 The Advisory Committee Note
accompanying Rule 902 indicates that the Rule is premised on the belief “that
41. Id. at 424.
42. Id. at 427–28.
43. Parker v. State, 85 A.3d 682, 686–88 (Del. 2014).
44.
See id. at 688 (noting that the Rule 104 standard is only appropriate if the trial judge
determines that the jury has enough facts to evaluate the authenticity of the proposed evidence).
45. FED. R. EVID. 901 advisory committee note.
46. Id.
47. FED. R. EVID. 902.
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forgery is a crime and detection is fairly easy and certain.” 48 In other words, the
authentication structure erected by the Federal Rules of Evidence is based upon
the foundational belief that the detection of forgeries is not only easy, but
certain. This supposition is borne out by the multitude of cases in which
handwriting experts testify that “forgeries [a]re easy to detect.” 49 These experts
frequently use “[c]omputer-based handwriting analysis systems,” and “[t]hese
systems have shown to be capable of detecting 100% of random and simple
forgeries and over 90% of skilled forgeries.” 50
Conversely, it is uniquely easy to create, and difficult to detect, social media
forgeries. On most social media websites, a user can create an account by simply
providing a “name, home address, e-mail address, age, sex, location, and birth
date,” 51 and “[t]he fact that a user profile is entirely self-generated can lead to
significant mischief and presents an interesting conundrum for law
enforcement.” 52 Because “fragments of information, either crafted under our
authority or fabricated by others, are available by performing a Google
search . . . forever,” it does not take much for anyone with Internet access to
create a convincing fake Facebook or Twitter profile for someone he barely
knows. 53 Moreover, “[b]ecause social media is often stored on remote servers, is
assessed through unique interfaces, can be dynamic and collaborative in nature,
and is uniquely susceptible to alteration and fabrication, evidentiary standards
developed for other types of electronically stored information [ESI] may not be
adequate.” 54
In addition, it is exceptionally easy to hack into another person’s social
media account. 55 Such a feat usually consists of simply coming up with the other
person’s password, which can be accomplished by something as simple as a guess
or more complex methods like a password-guessing tool, social engineering,
phishing, and spoofing. 56 In the end, the proof of the ease of social media
hacking is largely in the pudding. First, there have been a number of “hacks” of

48. FED. R. EVID. 902 advisory committee note.
49. E.g., Eason Publ’n, Inc. v. Nationsbank of Georgia, 458 S.E.2d 899, 901 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
50. Bryan Found., Doug Rogers & Robert Schmittat, ‘Matrix Analysis’: A Technique to
Investigate the Spatial Properties of Handwritten Images, 11 J. FORENSIC DOCUMENT EXAMINATION
51, 52–53 (1998).
51. Nathan Petrashek, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and the Brave New World of Online
Social Networking, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 1495, 1499 n.16 (2010).
52. Id.
53. David Hector Montes, Living Our Lives Online: The Privacy Implications of Online Social
Networking, Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y,
Spring 2009, at 508.
54. H. Christopher Boehning & Daniel J. Toal, Authenticating Social Media Evidence, N.Y.L.J.,
Oct. 2, 2012, at para. 4.
55. Kathryn Kinnison Van Namen, Comment, Facebook Facts and Twitter Tips—Prosecutors
and Social Media: An Analysis of the Implications Associated with the Use of Social Media in the
Prosecution Function, 81 MISS. L.J. 549, 565 (2012).
56. See Michael Brittain & K. James Sullivan, 5 Principles for Minimizing the Likelihood and
Effects of Cyber Attacks, WESTLAW J. COMPUTER & INTERNET, October 19, 2012, at 2 (2012).
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high profile Twitter accounts in recent years. 57 Second, many recent “cases in
which romantic partners have accessed social networking accounts illustrate the
susceptibility of social media accounts to security breaches.” 58
B.

The Impracticality of Standard Rule 901(b)(4)

Such concerns about social media forgery might be acceptable if courts
applied an admissibility standard that substantially quelled concerns about
authenticity. As noted, courts typically allow for the authentication of social
media evidence under Rule 901(b)(4). 59 The problem is that, as currently
applied, 901(b)(4) is an analog rule in a digital world.
The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 901(b)(4) proffers three ways in
which the characteristics of the offered item itself allow for authentication.
1.

Peculiar Knowledge

First, “a document or telephone conversation may be shown to have
emanated from a particular person by virtue of its disclosing knowledge of facts
known peculiarly to him.” 60 As support for this proposition, the Advisory
Committee cites Globe Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Braniff. 61
In Braniff, T.E. Braniff brought an action against the Globe Automatic
Sprinkler Company, seeking to recover a commission he was owed for securing a
contract for the installation of a sprinkler system. 62 The lawsuit hinged on the
authenticity of a letter the defendant allegedly wrote, offering to pay Braniff a
ten percent commission on the installation of any sprinkler systems installed
pursuant to contracts he assisted the defendant in procuring. 63 The Supreme
Court of Oklahoma found that the letter was properly authenticated because
“[t]he contents of the letter related to facts peculiarly within the knowledge of
the defendant’s agents and employees, and for the letter to have been written by
any person other than the defendant would have been a most unusual and
extraordinary thing to have happened.” 64
st
In the 21 century, however, the extraordinary has become ordinary, and
57. Julianne Pepitone, AP Hack Proves Twitter Has a Serious Cybersecurity Problem,
CNNMONEY (April 23, 2013, 3:23 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/04/23/technology/security/aptwitter-hacked/index.html.
58. Smith v. State, 136 So.3d 424, 435 (Miss. 2014); see, e.g., Campbell v. State, 382 S.W.3d 545,
552 (Tex. App. 2012) (reviewing evidence relating to Facebook account access for the defendant and
his girlfriend, the victim); Simmons v. Commonwealth, No. 2012-SC-000064-MR, 2013 WL 674721, at
*1 (Ky. Feb. 21, 2013) (discussing law enforcement obtaining sexually suggestive messages between an
adult and a middle-school student, because the adult’s girlfriend accessed his Facebook account when
he ended their relationship).
59. See supra Part IV.A for a discussion of the authentication of social media evidence using
FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4).
60. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4) advisory committee note.
61. Id. (citing Globe Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Braniff, 214 P. 127 (Okla. 1923)).
62. Braniff, 214 P. at 128.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 129.
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the notion that many facts are peculiarly in the knowledge of a single person or
small group of people seems quaint. And yet, many courts deem social media
postings authenticated based upon the assumption of such private knowledge. 65
In State v. Bell, 66 the Court of Common Pleas of Ohio allowed for the
authentication of MySpace messages in part because they allegedly “contain[ed]
code words known only to defendant and his [two] alleged victims.” 67 Before it
was reversed by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, the Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland found in Griffin that the “SNITCHES GET STITCHES” post was
properly authenticated by facts peculiarly in the knowledge of Griffin’s
girlfriend: her birthdate, the fact that she had two children with Griffin, and the
fact that Griffin went by the name “Boozy.” 68
Additionally, as was the case for Tiffany Parker, Travis Campbell’s case
started and ended with Facebook. On February 26, 2011, Campbell became
angry when he saw that his friend had sent a Facebook message to his girlfriend,
and Campbell allegedly assaulted his girlfriend the next day. 69 On March 2,
Campbell allegedly sent his girlfriend three Facebook messages, including one
that stated, “please help me ana i cry every day i am so f—ing stuppid [sic] for
hurthig [sic] u i am guilty what was I thinking please message me tell me your
mind let me talk please, I am so ashame [sic].” 70 The Court of Appeals of Texas,
Austin, found that these messages were properly authenticated in part because
“the messages reference the incident and potential charges, which at the time the
messages were sent, few people would have known about.” 71
In order for any of these rulings to hold water, it would have to be
extraordinary for anyone other than the alleged social media author to have the
relevant knowledge. In Bell, this was an impossibility because neither of the
defendant’s two alleged victims could have sent the MySpace messages;
alternately, if either the defendant or the victims used the “code words” around
other people or anywhere online, the knowledge would no longer have been
known peculiarly to them. 72 In Griffin, as the Court of Appeals of Maryland
acknowledged, any number of people could have known the birth date of
Griffin’s girlfriend, the fact that Griffin and she had two children together, and
the fact that Griffin went by the nickname “Boozy.” 73 Moreover, in Campbell,

65. See supra Part III for a discussion of cases in which an assumption of private knowledge was
a factor in authenticating social media evidence.
66. 882 N.E.2d 502 (Ohio C.P. 2008).
67. Bell, 882 N.E.2d at 68.
68. Griffin v. State, 995 A.2d 791, 806–07 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010); see also Michelle Sherman,
The Anatomy of a Trial with Social Media and the Internet, 14 J. INTERNET L. 1, 13–14 (2011)
(discussing the court’s reasoning in Griffin).
69. Campbell v. State, 382 S.W.3d 545, 547 (Tex. App. 2012).
70. Id. at 551.
71. Id. at 552.
72. See State v. Bell, 882 N.E.2d 502, 512 (Ohio C.P. 2008) (noting electronic communications
were authenticated in part because they contained code words known only to the defendant and his
alleged victims).
73. Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 423–24 (Md. 2011).
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four days had passed between the assault and the Facebook messages. 74 Four
days is more than enough time for a number of people to learn about the attack,
especially given that Campbell, his girlfriend, and his friend all had Facebook
accounts.
All of these cases reinforce the reality that we live in a brave new digital
world in which “almost nothing is private.” 75 Moreover, once information is
posted online, the word “almost” can be removed from the previous sentence. 76
Thus, it seems appropriate to raise the bar on exactly what type of “peculiar
knowledge” that allows for an inference of authentication under Rule 901(b)(4).
For instance, in State v. Eleck, 77 Simone Judway testified as a witness for the
prosecution that Robert Eleck told her “if anyone messes with me tonight, I am
going to stab them” soon before he allegedly stabbed the victim. 78 On crossexamination, Judway claimed that she had not spoken to Eleck in person, by
telephone, or by computer since the incident, prompting the defense to seek to
impeach her through Facebook messages allegedly exchanged between Eleck
and Judway after the incident. 79 One such exchange addressed the prior
acrimonious relationship between the two:
Simone Danielle: Hey I saw you the other day and I just want to say
nice bike.
[The Defendant]: why would you wanna talk to me
Simone Danielle: I’m just saying that you have a nice bike that’s all.
The past is the past. 80
The “Simone Danielle” Facebook account indisputably belonged to
Judway, but Judway claimed that the account was hacked, and the Connecticut
Appellate Court found that the messages could not be authenticated, thus
indicating that Eleck failed to satisfy the peculiar knowledge standard. 81
Specifically, the court was
not convinced that the content of this exchange provided distinctive
evidence of the interpersonal conflict between the defendant and
Judway. To the contrary, this exchange could have been generated by
any person using Judway’s account as it does not reflect distinct
information that only Judway would have possessed regarding the

74. Campbell, 382 S.W.3d at 553.
75. Charles E. MacLean, Katz on a Hot Tin Roof: The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Doctrine is Rudderless in the Digital Age, Unless Congress Continually Resets the Privacy Bar, 24 ALB.
L.J. SCI. & TECH. 47, 58 (2014).
76. Sarah L. Gottfried, Note, Virtual Visitation: The New Wave of Communication Between
Children and Non-Custodial Parents in Relocation Cases, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 567, 592 (2003)
(“[N]othing is private over the Internet”).
77. 23 A.3d 818 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011).
78. Eleck, 23 A.3d at 820.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 820 n.2.
81. See id. at 824 (stating that “this exchange could have been generated by any person using
Judway’s account as it does not reflect distinct information that only Judway would have possessed
regarding the defendant or the character of their relationship”).
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defendant or the character of their relationship. In other cases in which
a message has been held to be authenticated by its content, the
identifying characteristics have been much more distinctive of the
purported author and often have been corroborated by other events or
with forensic computer evidence. 82
Eleck reflects the reality of modern communications and the fact that peculiar
knowledge is truly peculiar in the social media realm. Accordingly, courts should
rely on something more than broad biographical data or the fact that “mere
days” have passed since a crime to conclude that such facts are peculiarly within
the knowledge of the alleged author of a social media post.
2.

“Reply Letter” Doctrine

Second, the Note to Rule 901(b)(4) indicates that “a letter may be
authenticated by content and circumstances indicating it was in reply to a duly
authenticated one.” 83 In order for this “reply letter” doctrine to apply, the
proponent must “prove that the first letter was dated, was duly mailed at a given
time and place, and was addressed to [the sender of the reply-letter].” 84 Thus, in
National Paralegal Institute Coalition v. Commissioner, 85 the government was
able to authenticate a “reply letter” written by the petitioner by establishing that
it was a response to a dated letter sent to the petitioner’s address. 86
In some cases involving the authentication of social media evidence,
however, courts have tried to extend this reply letter doctrine to a new
medium—the social medium —that is less hospitable to this type of
authentication. For instance, in Parker, the Delaware Supreme Court primarily
found that Tiffany Parker’s Facebook posts were authenticated because the
victim viewed Parker’s post through a mutual friend and shared the post by
publishing it on her own Facebook page. 87 Meanwhile, in Smith, the Supreme
Court of Mississippi found that the prosecution had not properly authenticated
Facebook messages only after disagreeing with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion
that the defendant’s messages were replies to his girlfriend’s Facebook
message. 88
These cases illustrate at least two problems with applying a liberal version
of the “reply letter” doctrine to social media evidence. Under the traditional
“reply letter” doctrine, a reply is authenticated in two ways by reference to an
original letter: (1) the original letter was sent to the alleged author’s house, and
(2) the “reply letter” replies to the content of the original letter. 89 In these cases,
82. Id.
83. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4) advisory committee note.
84. 2 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 224 at 95 (7th ed. 2013).
85. 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 623 (T.C. 2005).
86. Nat’l Paralegal Inst., 90 T.C.M. (CCH) at 625.
87. Parker v. State, 85 A.3d 682, 688 (Del. 2014).
88. Smith v. State, 136 So.3d 424, 435 (Miss. 2014) (“[I]t does not appear that Smith’s messages
are replying to anything in Waldrop’s message.”).
89. See BROUN ET AL., supra note 84, § 224 at 94–95 (discussing the method of authentication
under the “reply letter” doctrine).
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the fact that the original letter was sent to the alleged author’s house can be
proven through a deed, mortgage, or rental agreement, and authenticity is
established through the unlikelihood that someone else intercepted the original
letter and forged a response. 90
Conversely, because social media websites do not have similar property
records, and because such sites are created from user-generated data that can be
culled from quick Internet searches, courts in cases like Parker and Smith are
using the content of posts to establish ownership. In Parker, there was nothing
tying Tiffany Parker to the disputed Facebook page besides her picture and the
name “Tiffanni Parker.” 91 And in Smith, the girlfriend “did not testify as to how
she knew that the Facebook account was Smith’s, nor did she testify as to how
she knew that Smith actually authored the Facebook messages.” 92
Courts such as the Parker court also seem to fail to grasp the way that social
media websites work in applying the “reply letter” doctrine. For a reply to a
snail-mail letter to come from someone other than the addressee, the imposter
would have to burglarize the post office or pilfer the letter from the addressee’s
mailbox. On the other hand, Facebook messages can be copied or re-shared by
anyone who can see them, which is usually anyone with a Facebook account,
even if the user attempts to keep the information private. 93 Therefore, the fact
that the victim in Parker saw the Facebook messages on her friend’s page and
shared them on her own page says nothing more than that the victim thought
Parker’s Facebook page was authentic.
One of the few courts to recognize the problems with applying a liberal
version of the “reply letter” doctrine to social media evidence was the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Purdy. 94 In Purdy, the
court noted the existence of the “reply letter” doctrine but found that evidence
“that the electronic communication originates from . . . a social networking Web
site such as Facebook or MySpace that bears the defendant’s name is not
sufficient alone to authenticate the electronic communication as having been
authored or sent by the defendant.” 95 That said, the court ultimately found
authentication of the messages at issue based upon other evidence such as data
recovered from the hard drive of the defendant’s computer. 96 In Eleck, the
Appellate Court of Connecticut applied similar reasoning but found that the
reply letter doctrine could not be used to authenticate Facebook messages
90. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brooks, 508 A.2d 316, 319–320 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (noting that
a writing can be authenticated by circumstantial evidence that may take a number of forms, including
evidence of events preceding or following the execution of the delivery of the writing).
91. Parker, 85 A.3d at 684.
92. Smith, 136 So.3d at 434.
93. Kathryn R. Brown, Note, The Risks of Taking Facebook at Face Value: Why the Psychology
of Social Networking Should Influence the Evidentiary Relevance of Facebook Photographs 14 VAND.
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 357, 363 n.33 (2012) (citing Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/full_data_use_policy).
94. 945 N.E.2d 372 (Mass. 2011).
95. Purdy, 945 N.E.2d at 381 (citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 926 N.E.2d 1162 (2010)).
96. Id.
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because “there was a lack of circumstantial evidence to verify the identity of the
person with whom the defendant was messaging.” 97
Given the difference between a house and a website, courts should apply
something approximating the more rigorous analysis utilized by the courts in
Purdy and Eleck. It should not be enough that the alleged author replied to a
social media post; instead, courts should require additional evidence that links
the alleged author to the message.
3.

Language Patterns

Third, the Note to Rule 901(b)(4) states that “[l]anguage patterns may
indicate authenticity or its opposite.” 98 As support for this proposition, the
Committee cites Magnuson v. State, 99 a case in which a Swedish native was
charged with the bombing death of a victim in Marshfield, Wisconsin. 100 The
wrapper on the bomb was preserved, and, on it, “[t]he word ‘Marshfield’ was
misspelled, being written ‘Marsfilld,’ the ‘h’ and ‘e’ being omitted.” 101 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court observed that at trial the bomb wrapper was
authenticated as written by the defendant because (1) a professor “testified that
this spelling was characteristic of one familiar with the Swedish language as was
also the pronunciation ‘Mars’ for ‘Marsh,’” and (2) the defendant was the only
person with known enmity against the victim and “the only person of Swedish
nationality in the district.” 102 Because the bomb was sent locally in a package in
the mail, the court concluded that it was likely the defendant who sent it. 103
Many courts today use similar analysis to authenticate social media
evidence. In Campbell, the court found the defendant’s Facebook messages were
authenticated in large part because “the unique speech pattern presented in the
messages [wa]s consistent with the speech pattern that Campbell, a native of
Jamaica, used in testifying at trial.” 104 Meanwhile, in Tienda, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals used the appellant’s alleged three MySpace pages as “ample
circumstantial evidence—taken as a whole with all of the individual, particular
details considered in combination—to support a finding that the MySpace pages
belonged to the appellant and that he created and maintained them.” 105
Again, there are at least a few problems with applying this analysis to social
media evidence. First, in Magnuson, the defendant could be singled out as the
bomb’s sender because he was the only person of Swedish nationality in the
subject community. 106 Conversely, in a case like Campbell, the relevant

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818, 825 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011).
FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4) advisory committee note.
203 N.W. 749 (Wis. 1925).
Magnuson, 203 N.W. at 750.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 750.
Campbell v. State, 382 S.W.3d 545, 551–52 (Tex. App. 2012).
Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
Magnuson, 203 N.W. at 750.

14

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 87

community is the online community, where there are millions of people of
Jamaican nationality. This issue, of course, could partially be remedied by two of
the solutions proposed in Griffin: obtaining data from the alleged author’s hard
drive or the social media website. 107
Second, anyone with Internet access can view every tweet that a person has
tweeted and most content that a Facebook user has posted, making a “pattern”
analysis more problematic. 108 Indeed, “social media websites are designed to
share information with others,” and even information that a user intends to keep
private is almost always publicly accessible. 109
In 1925, the Magnuson court could conclude that it was unlikely that
somebody else mimicked the way that a person of Swedish decent might
communicate; in Campbell, anyone with Internet access could have viewed
Campbell’s Facebook content and created similar-looking content if they had
access to his account. Indeed, Campbell’s girlfriend admitted at trial that she
once had access to Campbell’s Facebook account, although she claimed that he
changed his password before he assaulted her. 110
Similarly, the defendant in Tienda might in fact have created three separate
MySpace pages; alternately, a “malefactor” could have viewed all of the content
on the defendant’s legitimate MySpace page and created a fake page, or pages,
similar to the genuine article in form and substance. Appreciating these
concerns, the court in Eleck refused to find authentication of a Facebook page
where there was evidence of a subsequent hacking of the page because the
hacking “highlight[ed] the general lack of security of the medium and raise[d] an
issue as to whether a third party may have sent the messages.” 111
Eleck should not be read for the proposition that a pattern analysis can
never be used to authenticate particular social media content given the lack of
security of the format. But, if a case features evidence of prior or subsequent
hacking, multiple accounts on the same platform, or access by an interested third
party, the proponent should have to present evidence of something beyond
consistency among posts or the ethnic background of the alleged author.
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts are increasingly at a crossroads with regard to the authentication of
social media evidence. Most courts cling to the belief that the risk of social media
forgery is no different that the forgery risk with other types of evidence and
continue to apply an authentication standard put in place when the “written
word” was still primarily written. A few courts, however, are beginning to
recognize that Rule 901(b)(4) is an analog rule in a digital world that must be
107.
108.

Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 427–28 (Md. 2011).
Brian M. Molinari, When Online Behavior Becomes a Real-World Problem, 16 N.Y. EMP.
L. LETTER, no. 9, 2009, at 1.
109. Agnieszka A. Mcpeak, The Facebook Digital Footprint: Paving Fair and Consistent
Pathways to Civil Discovery of Social Media Data, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 887, 928–29 (2013).
110. Campbell, 382 S.W.3d at 551.
111. State v. Eleck, 23 A.3d 818, 824 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011).
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ratcheted up to address an online world where nothing is private and a
medium—the social medium—where user profiles are self-generated and highly
susceptible to hacking. This essay is a first attempt to address how to raise the
bar on the authentication of social media evidence.

